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ABSTRACT
The popularity of mobile device has made people’s lives more con-
venient, but threatened people’s privacy at the same time. As end
users are becoming more and more concerned on the protection
of their private information, it is even harder to track a specific
user using conventional technologies. For example, cookies might
be cleared by users regularly. Apple has stopped apps accessing
UDIDs, and Android phones use some special permission to pro-
tect IMEI code. To address this challenge, some recent studies
have worked on tracing smart phones using the hardware features
resulted from the imperfect manufacturing process. These works
have demonstrated that different devices can be differentiated to
each other. However, it still has a long way to go in order to re-
place cookie and be deployed in real world scenarios, especially
in terms of properties like uniqueness, robustness, etc. In this pa-
per, we presented a novel method to generate stable and unique
device ID stealthy for smartphones by exploiting the frequency re-
sponse of the speaker. With carefully selected audio frequencies
and special sound wave patterns, we can reduce the impacts of non-
linear effects and noises, and keep our feature extraction process
un-noticeable to users. The extracted feature is not only very stable
for a given smart phone speaker, but also unique to that phone. The
feature contains rich information that is equivalent to around 40 bits
of entropy, which is enough to identify billions of different smart
phones of the same model. We have built a prototype to evaluate
our method, and the results show that the generated device ID can
be used as a replacement of cookie.
1. INTRODUCTION
Smart phone is playing an increasingly important role in our
daily lives, including both work and personal entertainment, which
makes the security of smart phones a very important and urgent
problem, especially the protection of user privacy. Smart phone
sales are experiencing nearly 40% year on year increasing reported
by IDC[8]. However, according to F-secure, a continued 49% rais-
ing of mobile threat was witnessed in the last quarter, and 91.3% of
them targeted at Android platform, the most popular mobile operat-
ing system today[4]. Different from traditional desktop PCs, smart
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phones often contain more private and sensitive information, like
SMS, contacts, location, etc. And studies showed that such sensi-
tive data is the major reason why smart phones are so attractive to
attackers [43].
Fortunately, people are becoming better educated to know how
to protect their privacy. Statistics from Pew Internet Project shows
that almost 90% of adult Internet users have taken steps to avoid
surveillance by other people or organizations, like clearing cook-
ies, encrypting email, and using an alias [2]. To attract users, ma-
jor browsers now support various privacy protection features, like
“Don’t Track”, third party cookie disabling, etc. Governments and
organizations are also working on laws to protect users’ privacy.
However, being able to track users is really useful and impor-
tant in many legitimate applications. So, it is not surprising to see
that many big companies declare plans to give up using cookie on
one side, but also work on new tracking technologies on the other
side [6]. There are also many studies on the stop-tracking and new
tracking technologies in the academia world [36, 32, 39, 28, 41, 29,
35].
Among these new tracking technologies, some suggested to use
device ID to substitute cookies [11], mainly because that device ID
is more straightforward and cannot be wiped or reset easily. Typi-
cally, many things can be used as device ID, such as UDID (Unique
Device ID) from Apple, IMEI for general mobile phones, Android
ID for Android phones, MAC addresses of Wi-Fi and Ethernet net-
work interfaces or Bluetooth modules [40], and so on. Some recent
researches also suggested to construct device ID using hardware
features resulted from imperfect manufacture process, like the ac-
celerometers [21] and speakers [19].
But each of these solutions has its own limitations which make
it hard to replace the traditional user tracking approach based on
cookies. On one hand, system vendors can easily block the ac-
cess of a device ID by removing relevant APIs, and on the other
hand, some newly discovered device ID is not mature enough to
be deployed in real world production scenarios. For example, Ap-
ple ceased the use of UDID recently [3], and on Android, access-
ing to IMEI requires a special permission that could be revoked
by Google if necessary (actually, Google made changes to Android
permission system from time to time, and recently, they just took
back the permission on SD card writing [1], so there is no guarantee
that they would not take back permission related to IMEI and other
possible device IDs). For newly discovered device IDs, like the one
extracted from accelerometers and speakers, the false positive rate
is still too high and they are not stable and robust enough to give
each device an unique ID (more details are given in section 8).
So, in this paper we propose another device ID generation method
that could reach the requirement that a cookie replacement should
do: uniqueness, robustness, and stealthy. Our basic idea is hardware-
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based identification on smart phone by leveraging frequency re-
sponse of speaker, while our technical is, however, totally different
from previous work, which improved the final results dramatically.
One of our fundamental differences to previous work is the use
of high frequency sound. In previous work [19], a piece of music
is played, which falls to the frequency range normally lower than
10 kHz, thus can be easily heard by the smart phone owner. What’s
more, majority of our environmental noises also fall into this range,
which makes the feature extraction difficult and unstable.
By contrast, our method uses audio frequency higher than 14 kHz,
which is chosen after careful studies of various factors, including
the environment noise, characteristics of human hearing, as well as
the manufacturing technology of speakers. For example, as shown
by our experiments in section 5, in most cases, there are less noise
in higher frequency range. What’s more, studies of human hearing
indicate that our ears are much less sensitive at sound with higher
frequency, which means that people can easily hear a sound with
4 kHz at 30 dB, but is hard to perceive another 16 kHz sound at the
same 30 dB (more details are given in section 3).
More importantly, we found that speakers perform more diversely
at higher frequency range, which helped us be able to get unique
feature for each of them with negligible false positive and false neg-
ative rates. Ideally, we would expect each speaker perform in the
same way: output every frequency equally without any attenuation.
However, this is impossible in real world, so speaker manufacturers
have to make trade-offs among the cost, manufacturing technology,
and the perception of human ears. As mentioned above, people are
more sensitive to low frequency audio, so the speaker manufactur-
ers focused on the optimization at lower frequency range first, and
optimize higher frequency range later only if cost/budget permits.
As the result, it is not surprising that the frequency response curves
of the same products are similar at lower frequency range, but differ
to each other dramatically at higher frequency range (more details
will be given in section 3).
Another fundamental difference to previous work is that we con-
struct audio stimulus pattern carefully to minimize the impacts of
non-linear characteristics of speaker and background noises. In-
stead of playing a piece of random chosen music, as was done in
previous work, we choose to output a stable combination of about
seventy different frequencies, and later when extracting features,
only analyze response at these frequency points. So, noises not
on those frequency points can be filtered, but more importantly,
the speaker can work in a stable state in which its features can be
exposed steadily and completely. We believe that such design is
crucial to get unique and robust device ID.
Contributions. We summarize our contributions as follows:
• We carefully analyzed many different factors that could af-
fect the construction of unique and robust device ID from
mobile phone speakers, and proposed to use high frequency
sound with special frequency pattern as stimulation to speak-
ers, which not only can make the whole process unnoticeable
by the smart phone owners, but also can minimize the impact
of background noises and non-linear features.
• We developed novel algorithms to extract and match features
from the recorded speaker response, which is built on self-
correlation and cross-correlation functions, instead of using
complex machine learning algorithm. We also developed
method to estimate the potential false positive and false neg-
ative rate.
• We built a prototype and performed a comprehensive eval-
uation over the proposed method, and the results show that
the extracted device ID is very stable, with negligible false
positive and false negative rates.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We list
required assumptions and adversary models in Section 2 and then
give an overview of our proposed method in section 3. The details
of our design in given in section 4, followed by a comprehensive
evaluation of the proposed design in terms of different metrics in
Section 5. Section 6 presents some real world application cases in.
We compare our work with prior ones in Section 8, and discussed
the potential limitations in Section 7. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2. ADVERSARY MODEL
This section describe the assumptions required to extract device
ID from smart phone speakers, and the potential adversary/applica-
tion scenarios our method may be applicable.
2.1 Application Scenarios
As a device fingerprinting technology, the method to be inves-
tigated in this paper is pretty neutral, and its only purpose to ex-
tract some features from the sound played by smart phone speakers.
There are two typical application scenarios: self-fingerprinting and
cross-fingerprinting. In self-fingerprinting, an application is trying
to get device ID of the smart phone on which it is running, and in
cross-fingerprinting, application on one smart phone is trying to get
device ID of another smart phone (with the help of an app on that
phone which is periodically playing specially crafted audio).
The extracted device ID itself can have many useful applications.
For example, it can be used to replace cookie to accurately trace an
end user by online advertisers in order to deliver targeted advertise-
ments. It can also be used to in-door tracking and tracking stolen
smart phone to support self-destruct. More details will be given in
Section 6.
2.2 Assumptions
The device fingerprinting process actually contains three steps:
play the specially crafted audio, record the speaker output, and
transmit the preprocessed feature to server. These three steps can
be mapped to three different operations or permissions: play audio,
access microphone, and access Internet.
• Play audio: According to current Android permission mech-
anism, playing audio does not require any permission.
• Access to microphone: This is the only necessary permission
required by our proposed method, since we have to record the
speaker output. However, depending on the specific applica-
tion scenario, the microphone permission could locate on the
same phone that playing the audio (i.e., self-fingerprinting),
or on a different phone (cross-fingerprinting).
• Access to Internet: This permission is unnecessary and can
be bypassed using an existing vulnerability mentioned in [45]
by appending the data to a GET request of stock browsers.
The size of each extracted feature never exceeds 1 KB, so
the length limitation of GET request is also not a problem.
3. OVERVIEW
In this section we introduce the reason why to study sound acous-
tic fingerprinting of mobile devices though some related work al-
ready existed, and briefly describe the technical background of our
approach.
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3.1 Three Goals to Be Achieved
We believe that any device fingerprinting technology, in order to
be a substitution of cookie, should achieve following three goals si-
multaneously: uniqueness, robustness, and stealthiness. In terms of
uniqueness, the fingerprints generated for different devices should
be different enough to each other, otherwise there would be serious
usability problem (imagine that two different users share an identi-
cal cookie). Robustness means the fingerprints generation method
should be able to generate a consistent fingerprints for the same de-
vice at different time and under different scenarios. The last goal,
stealthiness, require the fingerprints generation process should be
unnoticeable by device owners.
Limitations of existing solutions. When considering above goals,
we found that existing solutions have various limitations. For ex-
ample, the work done in [19] needs to play some audible music,
which make it hard to achieve “stealth” goal. In another work that
uses accelerometers to track user, there would always be at least
1 device out of 107 wrongly identified, which may not be accu-
rate enough for cookie based applications in real world [21]. More
details will be given in related work section 8.
3.2 Our Key Techniques
Our key techniques could be described in a single sentence: use
microphone to record the output from device speaker stimulated by
high frequency audio wave with some special pattern. However,
it requires more words to explain the rationale behind and how
uniqueness, robustness, and stealthiness are achieved with these
techniques.
3.2.1 Be Stealthy with High Frequency Audio
Common sense tells us that human being cannot hear all voice
generated by the world. For example, infrasonic wave produced by
earthquake doesn’t make any feeling to human but can be detected
by machines, which play an important role in the disaster forecast-
ing. Ultrasonic, possesses similar attributes. Figure. 1 shows how
is human’s hearable zone [10].
Figure 1: Sound Pressure Level of Human over Frequency.
Most people are sensitive from some hundreds Hz to some thou-
sands Hz and can only feel little lower than 200 or higher than 15
kHz if the sound is as loud as what generated by the phone. In other
words, you can hear almost nothing if your cell-phone is playing a
clip of music of which spectrum is null between 200 and 15 kHz.
3.2.2 Be Unique with High Frequency Audio
Inside each speaker driver, a flexible cone attached with a coil
of wire is mounted on the suspension, which allow it move freely
inside the magnet. The coil, passed with electrical currents, creates
a varying magnetic field that react with the fixed magnet and drive
the cone to fluctuate according to the currents [18]. Figure. 2
illustrates the structure of the speaker [18].
Figure 2: Sectional View to Speaker Driver.
High-end speaker systems may contain more than a single driver
to let each driver focused on each frequency band and enhance the
quality thereby, because that one driver can hardly handle the en-
tire audible frequency range limited by the mechanical feature of
the driver. In the lower-end speaker market, like what in the phone,
where usually only one driver is used, manufacture is capable to
control the quality of their product in only a narrow frequency
range, while quality outside the important frequency range is less
concerned for some reasons.
Firstly, the important frequency range covers most of human’s
sensitive frequency range, while we are not sensitive to the left fre-
quency range, which leads the quality control outside the main fre-
quency range less meaningful.
Secondly, compensating the quality costs a lot, which increases
the overall costs and decrease the competitiveness of the manufac-
ture in terms of price. For example, adding an independent high
frequency driver enhances the quality sharply, however increases
the cost multiple times. So phones in the market are often equipped
with only single speaker driver.
As the result, manufacture control the sensitive range quality and
let alone the insensitive frequency range.
Frequency response presents the quality of a speaker from the
perspective of frequency, which weight the quality of a speaker
by reflecting the gain or attenuation the speaker provide at each
frequency point. It is easy to conduct that the more the response
curve is flat, the better voice quality will it provide. Figure 3, cap-
tured from the Internet [5], presents the frequency response of three
speakers which shows that: at low frequency segment, they have
similar response curves, meanwhile, at high frequency segment,
their response curves are different to each other dramatically. Not
only the variances between different models of speakers but also
the differences between what of the same model are huge.
Both theoretical analysis and experimental result, which will be
shown in the evaluation section, drives us to decide to use the high
frequency range response feature, as it carries high variations be-
tween each speaker individuals.
3.2.3 Be Robust with Controlled Stimulus Patterns
The sampling data collected by many previous work are just
the results of uncontrolled input stimulus. For example, in [21],
the sampled accelerometer readings are stimulated by random user
movement. In [19], even though the music played could controlled,
but the frequency component combinations and variations are de-
termined by the stimulation as well as the abundant noise permu-
tated in the environment. Due to the non-linear features of speakers,
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Figure 3: Frequency response of 3 speakers.
like inter-modulations [18], the recorded sound may contain lots of
noises that would make the result unstable. The software-based
method like browser configuration tracking also suffers from noise
that is user’s configuration modification.
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Figure 4: Stimulation.
In contrast, we propose to use a controlled audio wave pattern
to drive the speaker, so that the results is more robust to random
and non-linear factors, and less vulnerable to noises. One example
pattern is shown in Figure 4.
The stimulation lies in a frequency range that interfered only
little by the environment. As the spectrum of noise in different
environment will be shown in Figure. 12, we found the silent en-
vironment in high frequency band provides a perfect test bed for
measuring the frequency response of the speaker. It is just the less-
interfered environment, controlled stimulation that brought robust-
ness to the scheme.
4. DESIGN
In this section, we introduce how the scheme generate stimu-
lation, calculate frequency response and search the feature in the
database.
4.1 Stimulation Generation
In our scheme, the android phone itself generates appropriate
acoustic signal by playing a period of synthetic sound as the stim-
ulation and itself collects the response from the microphone. Com-
paring with the passive generation, where the response is highly
affected by the stimulation provider, active one, in fact, provide
plain, pure and noise-less response resulted from a self-controlled
stimulation.
We didn’t use a wave with continuous flat frequency band be-
cause the power of the signal is constrained resulted from a very
high PAPR (Peak to Average Power Ratio) in that case. We also
didn’t adopt a frequency shifted music, because the complex fre-
quency combinations make the output unstable because of the non-
linearity attribute of the speaker. Instead, we adopted the stimula-
tion shown in figure. 4. It is consist of a series of cosine wave from
14 kHz to 21 kHz with 100 Hz gap between neighbor frequency
points. In order to play the high frequency sound, we set the sam-
ple rate of the PCM format input to the android API at 44100 Hz.
4.2 Feature Generation
The feature is generated by measuring the frequency response
curve. This section illustrate how to generate a feature.
To get the frequency response, we use the spectrum of recording
divided by the input. The spectrum of recording is calculated by the
FFT. The process of dividing by the input can be neglected since the
magnitude in each frequency point is a constant and the response
will be normalized later.
In this way, the measured response, in fact, is the response of
the whole acoustic chain. However because cascaded system can
be regarded as a single system which possesses a system function
that is the product of all the subsystem. The signal recorded di-
vided by the signal of the input tells the function of all the system
cascaded lying in the chain. And the system functions of media,
microphone, chip contribute little variance, which result it to be re-
garded as flat systems that amplify or diminish the signal evenly to
every frequency point in the range. Therefore, the whole system
function can be regarded as the amplified or diminished version of
the speaker’s. As the result, we just use the system function of the
whole system function to represent what of the speaker’s.
Considering the response feature, in the effective points, the fre-
quency response is signal mixed with interference of noise brought
by the environment. While in the gap between effective points, the
response is meaningless because there exists only noise. So only
the effective points are counted when producing the feature. Be-
sides, in each point, the phase can be neglected because it is easily
interfered by the environment. So we only calculate aptitude in-
stead of considering the complex number.
To save communication bandwidth and storage, in this scheme,
only aptitude of 71 effective frequency points were counted. And it
is not the truth that the more points are sampled, the higher entropy
will it accumulate, because the power of the stimulation will be
allocated to each frequency point, where not sufficient power leads
to not sufficient SNR (signal noise ratio) and a not stable curve
thereby. So we use a vector containing the 71 effective aptitude as
the representation of the feature.
4.3 Feature Matching
Matching two device is just matching the two curve, hence, the
vectors they owned. To judge if the two vectors come from the
same device, the proof is their similarity. The more similar the two
vectors are, the more possible that they come from the same device.
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Mathematically, the distance between two vectors can be utilized to
weight the similarity of two vectors. The shorter the distance is, the
more similar they will be. Once the newly received feature is close
enough to some existed feature in the database, they will be judged
as produced by the same device. Otherwise, a new profile will be
set up for the new comer.
In the experiment phase, we just use the brute force algorithm
to get the most similar feature vector met before and judge if the
distance between them reached a predefined threshold(an experi-
mental value 0.7 is set in the experiment phase) to tell if it is a new
user or it is just the user the most similar vector represent. Be-
cause ultra-large scale data has not been collected and searched,
this scheme runs pretty fast. In fact, with the expansion of the scale
of the data, matching users one by one becomes time wasting and
not feasible. But this never mask the fact that the float vector can be
easily fuzzy searched using Locality Sensitive Hashing or k-NN al-
gorithm. In that case, the searching time complexity can be reduced
to nearly a constant. [24, 44, 37]
5. EVALUATION
As a practical and feasible fingerprint, the scheme should be in-
spected in some aspects. For example, fingerprint should be stable
as it changes little from time to time, which remind us to check
the stability of the frequency response. This section shows our test
result to answer the following questions:
• Performance Can the scheme be applied to large scale user
tracking? Specifically, can a large amount of users be distin-
guished from each other.
• Stability How stable is the response curve? Is it feasible for
long term user tracking.
• Interference How the noise in different environment interfere
the performance of the scheme.
5.1 Experiment Setting
According to previous study, it is much easier to distinguish
phones of different models and from different manufacturers [19],
so in this paper, we focus on the testing of different phones from
the same model. To complete the test economically, we decided to
conduct the experiments on 50 OEM speakers on a single Samsung
Galaxy S3. We modified the Galaxy S3 by converting the soldered
speaker interface into a pluggable socket, as shown in Figure 5,
then we purchased 50 OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer)
speakers which are coming from the same assembly line and have
continuous Serial Numbers. These speakers are soldered with two-
pin plugs, so that they can be easily connected to the phone.
To study the scheme justifiedly, the experiment in conducted in
the normal office environment with normal noise level if it is not
postulated intentionally in the following part. During the exper-
iment, classmates’ conversation is not prohibited on one side to
emulate common case, on another to prove the low noise level in
the high frequency range.
To each emulated phone, 60 sets of response feature was col-
lected for further evaluation. Thus, totally 3000 vectors have been
collected.
5.2 Metrics
The metrics listed are used to evaluate the scheme:
• Feature Distance Since the feature is actually a vector in N-
space, we simply define the feature distance as the Euclidian
Figure 5: Experiment Equipment.
distance in N-space listed below:
d(p, q) =
√√√√ N∑
i=0
(qi − pi)2
where p and q are two feature vectors defined as:
p = (p0, p1, · · · , pN−1), q = (q0, q1, · · · , qN−1)
• Similarity We use similarty to measure how likely the two
features p, q are coming from the same phone, and it is de-
fined as
1− d(p, q)
• False Positive We define a case as false positive if phone A
is falsely recognized as another phone B based on the input
features.
• False Negative We define a case as false Negative if no matches
can be found in the database for features from phone A that
actually does exist in the database.
• Entropy The logarithm of (the size of the distinguishable set)
to base 2 is the entropy of the scheme. The distinguishable
set is the set that all the contained element can be distin-
guished from each other by the feature produced.
5.3 Performance
At first, we planned to count the quantity of false. So, the 3000
feature vectors are input to the process in a random sort. The out-
put is checked with right answer to count false positive and false
negative. We are very happy to tell that no false positive nor false
negative found in the 3000 test cases. But it can hardly justify
the performance of the scheme when the quantity of test cases in-
creases sharply. So, we refer to the distribution of the similarity to
calculate the performance in the large scale case.
5.3.1 Distribution of similarity
We found there is a gap between similarities of the same phone
and the similarities of different phones, which is the main reason
of the good performance. We investigated the distribution of sim-
ilarities between different phones (simcorr) and within the same
phones (simself ) respectively. Specifically, in terms of simself ,
to each device, comparison between the 60 features results to C260
simself . So, totally 50* C260 simself are collected. In terms of
simcorr , there are C250 devices pairs, where 60*60 similarities can
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Figure 6: Distribution of Similarities.
be calculated in each pair. So, totally, 3600 ∗C250 simcorr are col-
lected. The PDF (probability density function) of the distribution
is shown in Figure 6.
The gap between the PDF of simcorr and simself revealed the
reason that we found no false. Specifically, the similarity between
different phones spans in a range which has no common part with
what of similarity between the same phones. Generally speaking,
the maximum value of the simcorr is less than the minimum value
of simself . So, facing a newly arrived feature vector, the simi-
larity between it and its’ nearest neighbor is calculated. It can be
concluded that they comes from the same device if only this sim-
ilarity locates at the right side of the gap. Otherwise, the feature
comes from a unknown device.
Because the error rate of the scheme is directly linked with the
probability distribution over the gap. However, under this setting,
the probability of feature’s crossing the gap is unknown resulted
from lacking with such observation. So, we shift to get an analyti-
cal description of the PDF.
5.3.2 Distribution Fitness
We inspected the two distribution to find their proper distribution
type respectively. We found that both of them are unsymmetrical
shaped. So we traversed all the common seen distribution to find
the type that fit the observations well. We tried to fit the data to 20
continuous distribution types. After analyzing the fitness, we found
that the 2 types of distance derived from observations to feature
vectors from either the same phones or different phone pairs fall
into Lognormal Distribution well. The fitted distribution is shown
in Figure. 7.
−0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
0
5
10
15
20
similarity
 
 
PDF of similarity between the same phones
PDF of similarity between different phones
Fitted PDF of similarity between the same phones
Fitted PDF of similarity between different phones
Figure 7: Fitted Distribution of Similarities.
Because distance falls in Lognormal distribution. The similarity,
which is 1 - distance, falls in the distribution with the following
PDF:
fself =
1
(1− simself )σ
√
2pi
e−(ln(1−simself )−µ)
2/2σ2
Where the fitted parameter gives µ = −3.17698, σ = 0.546804.
fcorr =
1
(1− simcorr)σ
√
2pi
e−(ln(1−simcorr)−µ)
2/2σ2
Where the fitted parameter gives µ = −0.457726, σ = 0.178714.
5.3.3 Scale
We prove that the distribution can be applied to the large scale
case. Doubt may be casted on the assumption that the distribu-
tion may be correlated with the quantity of the phones. We argue
that the distribution of simcorr changes little with the increasing
of device quantity, which implies that the error rate of the scheme
doesn’t increase when the quantity of the devices increases. Changes
of parameters µ and σ according different quantity of devices are
shown in Figure. 8.
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Figure 8: Parameter vs Device Quantity.
As we can see, the parameters converge to constants when the
quantity increases. Based on the result, we assume the model is
suited for large scale similarity representation.
5.3.4 Error Rate Analysis
We give the theoretical analysis to the error rate based on the
model deducted from the prior part. We analyze the false positive
rate and false negative respectively first. We then calculate their
sum and analyze the error rate under multiple sampling time case.
At last, we tell the scheme operator that the parameter can be tuned
such that it performs best satisfying the cookie substitution case.
False Positive Theoretically, if an alien observation to simcorr
crossed the gap and fell into the range occupied by the simself ,
it may be regarded as produced by some device already in the
database. The probability of this case is 1 − Fcorr(α), where α is
the threshold set by server. Curve false positive in Figure. 9 shows
the relationship between α and error rate.
There exists another case, which also leads to false positive. Fea-
ture vector produced by Alice may have a simcorr with Bob’s that
is higher than simself of Alice her self’s, which lead server to out-
put Bob. The probability of this case is
∫ 1
α
fcorr(x)Fself (x)dx,
which is preeminently less than 1 − Fcorr(α). As the result, it is
neglected when calculating the error rate.
False Negative An observation to simself may fall into the range
belongs to simcorr , which misleads the server to output null in-
stead of the right answer. The probability of this case is Fself (α),
as it is shown in Curve False Negative of Figure. 9.
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Overall Error Rate The error of the scheme is defined by the
sum of false positive and false negative. The error rate calculated by
the sum of the two kinds of error rate thereby. It changes according
to α, which is shown in Figure 9. The figure tells that lower α
brings to more false positive while higher α leads to more false
negative. The valley point of the curve locates at 0.69, which imply
that setting threshold to 0.69 gives the the best performance.
As we can see, the error rate is around 1.55*10−4, when the
threshold is set at 0.69.
Performance Enhancement Sampling multiple times elevate
the performance sharply. Collecting each feature vector cost only
little. And each sampling can be regarded as independent, which
therefore inspired us to collect feature more than once to decrease
the error rate. For example, if we collect 2 samples each time, the
error rate decreases sharply because the false positive happens only
if both two samples are false positive sample, and the false nega-
tive happens only if both two samples are false negative sample.
Figure. 10 shows that the error rate of the twice scheme is around
1.41*10−8, when the threshold is set at 0.68. Hence, 1.23*10−12
error rate can be achieved if 3 times sampling is adopted.
Biased Case The threshold parameter can be tuned to satisfy
different cases. For instance, as the substitution to cookie, the con-
sequence brought by false positive and false negative is not equal.
Specifically, clearing cookies often results to regard an old user as
a new comer, which is similar to the false negative. While seldom
will a piece of cookie be judged wrongly as someone other’s with
neither rhyme nor reason, that is false positive. As the result, the
tolerance to false negative of the server used present is much higher
than what of false positive. To this end, the threshold α can be el-
evated to trade false negative performance for the performance of
false positive.
5.4 Stability
We argue that the higher frequency response feature is a kind of
long-term stable and unchangeable feature. To be a kind of identity,
the feature should be stable span a range of time. But in the case
of cookie, different people clear their cookie with different time
gap. Some people never clear their cookie while some others never
save the cookie, which casts doubt on the stability of the cookie
as a kind of identity. To prove our scheme’s stability, we chose 2
speakers randomly and collect feature vector every 1 hour to each
emulated phone. As the result, we have collected 60 feature vectors
to each phone totally. The vectors produced by the first phone are
labeled from 1 to 60, while the vectors produced by the second one
are labeled form 61 to 120. Figure. 11 shows the similarity between
the 120 vectors.
Figure 11: Correlated Similarity.
As concluded from Figure. 11, there is no obvious decreases in
similarity between feature vectors within the same phone collected
from the first hour to the last hour. Also, we haven’t observed ob-
vious increase in similarity between the two phones from hour to
hour. So, the experiment concludes that the higher frequency re-
sponse feature is long-term stable.
5.5 Interference
The higher frequency response is affected by the noise in the
higher frequency range, which is pure and silent in most cases. In
order to prove the ability to anti interference, we have tested the
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Figure 12: Noise in Office, Street and Metro.
scheme in different environment with different noise, ranging from
office, street, metro station. The result is positive in all cases ex-
cept the metro station. Figure. 12 shows the spectrum of noise on
the air in the 3 environment. We will present both qualitative and
quantitative analysis to the anti-interference ability of the scheme.
Qualitative Analysis In the effective frequency range, thus from
14kHz to 21kHz, The environment is silent in the case of office and
street, though there is loud human being’s voice and other noise,
which doesn’t locate at the effective band. So the response feature
can be calculated with only little interference. In the case of metro,
the noise spans all the sampling frequency range includes the effec-
tive band, which overwhelm the signal broadcasted and make the
calculation result meaningless. So, we conclude that the scheme
works if only the high frequency band is silent.
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Figure 13: SNR requirement over different α.
Quantitative Analysis In this section, we try to find out the high-
est noise level at which the scheme works. To simplify the prob-
lem, we reasonably assume that the feature is absolutely stable and
all the distance between the features of the same phone is resulted
from the interferences in the environment. The sampled spectrum
of signal is denoted as ~X , while the noise is denoted as ~N . We also
assume that there is little correlation between ~X and ~N , and the
expected mean of the ~N is zero (We assume like this because the
noise is often white noise), which leads ~X and ~N to be regarded
orthogonal and ~X · ~N = 0 thereby. The Similarity calculated in
fact is:
1−
√
(
~X
| ~X| −
~X + ~N
| ~X + ~N | )
2
= 1−
√
2− 2
~X( ~X + ~N)
| ~X|| ~X + ~N |
= 1−
√
2− 2 |
~X|
| ~X + ~N |
We consider the false negative in the interfered environment while
neglect the case of false positive, because noise can easily make a
feature distorted, but hardly make a feature similar to another. The
server output right answer when this similarity between the 2 fea-
ture vectors is higher than a threshold α. Thus:
1−
√
2− 2 |
~X|
| ~X + ~N | > α
⇒ |
~X|
| ~X + ~N | >
1 + 2α− α2
2
⇒ |
~X|2
| ~X|2 + | ~N |2 >
α4 − 4α3 + 2α2 + 4α+ 1
4
⇒ SNR
SNR+ 1
>
α4 − 4α3 + 2α2 + 4α+ 1
4
⇒ SNR > 1 + 4α+ 2α
2 − 4α3 + α4
3− 4α− 2α2 + 4α3 − α4
Where SNR is
| ~X|2
| ~N |2
The SNR can be calculated in this way according to Parseval’s
theorem, which indicate the power of a signal can also be the sum of
the power of each frequency component. While the power of each
component is the square of its amplitude. Therefore, the square to
the normal of the vector is just the power.
The relationship between α and error rate, thus Figure. 13, shows
the SNR requirement in avoiding false positive in different α set-
ting. As we can see, in the normal setting, thus α = 0.7, the SNR
requirement is 10 dB. That means the scheme output right answer if
only the SNR in the effective frequency band in higher than 10 dB.
Don’t forget that the noise power is only counted for those locate
at the effective frequency points, which possesses only little of the
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overall noise power.
5.6 Entropy
We calculate entropy in this part, because entropy is important
in evaluating an identity scheme. Entropy weights how many in-
formation the identity carries, hence how many devices can be dis-
tinguished from each other. Specifically, in order to distinguish a
set of devices whose size is N, at least log2N bits entropy should
be carried during a round of identification. Therefore, we analyze
how many devices can be distinguished by deploying our scheme.
After setting the threshold parameter α to the optimized one, the
error rate can be calculated accordingly. So, the entropy can be cal-
culated if only the relationship between error rate and the size of
the distinguishable size is decided. Approximately 1/error_rate
devices can be distinguished at the given error_rate, because less
than one error will be found expectedly. As the result, we regard
all the 1/error_rate devices distinguishable accordingly. The en-
tropy the identity carries is −log2(error_rate) under the settings
thereby.
We believe that each feature transferred back to the server car-
ries entropy. So, with the increasing of feature vectors used linearly,
the error rate decreases geometrically and the entropy increases lin-
early, because of the independence between 2 samplings. As cal-
culated before, the error rate is at 1.55*10−4, if one feature vector
is utilized to make judgement. According to the error rate, 12.6
bits entropy can be achieved in the single sampling case. Hence,we
can get 26bits in the double sampling case or 39.6 bits in 3 times
scheme.
6. APPLICATION
The device ID extract from our proposed scheme can not only
replace traditional cookies, but also be used beyond that, and this
section will give brief introduction to some of them.
6.1 Stolen phone tracing and self-destruction
Recently, lawmakers in California has approved a so-called “kill
switch” bill, which requires all smart phones sold in the state to
have anti-theft software installed, so that once the device is lost or
stolen, it cannot be used any more, even after a hard reset [16].
However, in order to achieve that goal, the first step is being able
to uniquely identify a device. This is not a trivial task, given the
fact that the phone could be reset, re-flashed with different oper-
ating system image, or even modify the IMEI code via software.
In other words, since every piece of current device information is
stored in Flash memory, and the Flash memory is under the control
of adversaries, there is nothing can prevent them to modify such
information and defeat the “kill switch” mechanism.
Our speaker-based device ID can help address the challenge.
Any changes in the software cannot change our hardware based
device IDs. So, in order to check if current phone has been re-
ported as stolen, the system vendors need only to perform a quick
and un-noticeable test, and then look up the generated device ID in
the stolen phone database.
To avoid such detection, the adversaries have to modify the hard-
ware, but the cost is high, not only because the extra money to buy
new parts, but also the time and skills to perform such hardware
modification (especially when the phones are becoming more diffi-
cult to be dissected).
6.2 Location information broadcast and relay
Many applications require getting position information to com-
plete some useful functions. For example, instant message applica-
tions can let you know and make friends with people nearby. How-
ever, current designs require user to grant the applications to access
user’s current position, which users often decline, either due to the
privacy concerns, or avoid overly power consumption used by GPS
subsystem.
But with our proposed scheme, applications can easily share and
relay position information, and following is a typical scenario. Sup-
pose there are many people in a conference room, but only one of
them turned on the location service, so the server can put informa-
tion of device ID and the location of that conference room into a
database. Now the application will periodically play the specially
crafted sound, which can be captured and cross-fingerprinted by
other phones nearby. Once the device ID is extracted, those smart-
phones will query the database on the server, and retrieve the loca-
tion information generated by another phone with GPS turned on.
Once a new phone get its location information, it starts to broadcast
its identity, and thus the location information can be relayed across
the whole conference room.
6.3 Indoor tracking
Indoor tracking has a huge market potential, with which super-
market and department stores can send coupons and targeted adver-
tisements to their customers. There are already several technologies
available, like Bluetooth based iBeacon from Apple [7], and WiFi
based solutions [12]. The device ID proposed in this paper can also
be used in this scenario. First, whenever the user enters a super-
market, her phone will receive a signal to trigger the periodically
playing of the inaudible sound, which is actually equal to broadcast
its device ID from time to time. Such broadcasting will be received
by microphones deployed all around the supermarket, then a cross-
fingerprinting is performed, and a unique device ID extracted. By
correlate the device ID with the microphone location, it is easy to
know the route of the user in the supermarket, what her favorite
is, and what is still under consideration, etc. With the same tech-
nology, it is also possible to associate the purchase history to a
specific device ID, simply by putting a cross-fingerprinting micro-
phone near the check-out counter.
7. DISCUSSION
In this section we will discuss the potential limitations of our pro-
posed method, more specifically, the interference from background
noises, and the detection of application doing fingerprinting.
7.1 Interference from background noises
Although our proposed scheme has a special design on frequency
combinations at about seventy discrete frequency points, it could
still fail to extract unique device IDs under environments saturated
with high power noise signals, like train station, crowding restau-
rant, etc.
To overcome such limitation and make our method work even
under low Signal-Noise-Ratio (SNR), we may try to use some ad-
vanced methods borrowing from communication area, and one ex-
ample is “Spread-spectrum Communication” [9]. Spread spectrum
communication generally makes use of a sequential noise-like sig-
nal structure to spread the normally narrow band information sig-
nal over a relatively wide band of frequencies. It can even do
frequency-hopping where information is sent following a sequence
of pseudo random frequencies. The receiver can reproduce the
same pseudo random sequence and thus is able to correlate the re-
ceived signals to retrieve the transmitted information [9].
Inspired by the spread-spectrum communication, we can mod-
ify the scheme accordingly. In each effective frequency point from
14 kHz to 21 kHz, the original mono tone sine wave is modulated
with a pseudo random sequence, such that the energy originally
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in the frequency point spreads to a frequency range, the width of
which is decided by the rate of the pseudo random sequence gen-
eration. As the result, the distributed energy decreases the energy
density sharply while the overall signal energy keeps unchanged,
since the consumed bandwidth increases. Later, the recorded audio
data will be sent to a band pass filter and de-spread to recover the
sine wave. Finally, the recovered sine wave at each frequency point
has different amplitude because the speaker attenuates the signals,
which reflects the features of that speaker.
7.2 Device ID for smart phones of different
models or from different manufacturers
In this paper, we only evaluated the features of 50 OEM speakers
for Samsung Galaxy S3. All the speakers are coming from the same
assembly line with continuous Serial Number printed on them. We
did not extend our study to smart phones from different manufac-
turers because of the assumption that speakers from different manu-
facturers are generally easier to be differentiated, and this has been
confirmed by previous work [19].
Even in the worst case that above assumption fails, we would
propose to incorporate other hardware feature or information into
the device ID. For example, the CPU type, memory capacity, op-
erating system version, etc. According to previous studies, an app
can get all above information without requesting any special per-
mission [45].
7.3 Detection of audio fingerprinting opera-
tion
Although an Android application based our proposed scheme
can disguise itself as legitimate one by requesting microphone ac-
cessing permission for other legal use, it is still possible to de-
tect if such application is trying to perform audio fingerprinting
or not. For example, it is required to do Fast Fourier Transform
on recorded response in order to generate audio stimulus, so with
some code analysis, it is possible to detect the existence of such
suspicious operations though it can be hidden into the equalizer
processing as if it is enhancing the audio quality. However, if an
application’s original function can include these operations, then
the detection problem is still very hard.
8. RELATED WORK
Software Fingerprint In terms of software feature, many browser
configuration information can be exploited to differentiate device,
such as User Agent, fonts installed, plugin information, benchmark
etc [22, 33, 14, 40]. Besides the browser, OS version, Kernel ver-
sion, application list can all be utilized to distinguish devices. Dif-
ferent implementation to the networking protocol can also be ex-
ploited to generate fingerprint, such as TCP initial window size, IP
header ID sequence generation [25, 38, 26].
Hardware Fingerprint In terms of hardware feature, a lot of
works have been devoted to identifying the devices by exploiting
minute differences of the signal produced by the component of the
phone. For example, wireless NIC can be distinguished by exploit-
ing feature from RF signal emitted by the transmitter [42, 23, 20,
13, 15, 17]. However they cannot be promoted to Internet tracking
usage, since there may be no direct physical link between user and
tracer. Data collected from accelerometer can also be used to distin-
guish user in [21] with coarse precision without active stimulation.
Photos taken by cameras can also be distinguished by pattern and
noise [31].
Scheme proposed in [19] also leveraged feature of speaker em-
bedded in the phone to identify users. However, they haven’t pointed
out how large scale their scheme can be applied to. Besides, the ro-
bustness of the cepstral feature is not evaluated, which casts doubt
on the feasibility of long-term tracking. What’s more, no practi-
cal method has been postulated in his scheme in terms of hiding
the identification process, while playing a clip of audible music as
stimulation will inevitably attract user’s attention.
Location Stealing Many researchers have also focused on po-
sition stealing method in android devices without corresponding
permission. Zhou et al. have studied how to infer the location with
public information provided by android without special permission
in [45]. Han et al. postulated that accelerometers in smartphones
can be utilized to infer location in [27]. Lester et al stated in [30]
that techniques have been found to determine if two phones are be-
ing carried by the same person. In [34], the author have raised a
kind of probabilistic method for positioning to mobile devices in
the pocket without GPS information.
9. CONCLUSION
This paper exhibited that there are differences between speaker
individuals of the smart phone, which is reflected on the differences
between the response curves. It is the differences that enable ap-
plications to generate unique identity according to response curve.
The identity is proved to be eligible as a kind of long-term track-
ing proof, because of its’ stability. The identity is also proved to
be entropy sufficient to incorporate all the phones in the world. In
terms of anti-interference, both practical experiments and theoret-
ical analysis are conducted to tell that the scheme works in com-
monly seen occasion except what with annoying high power noise.
Besides the identity, more seriously, the location of the device may
be exposed accompanied with, resulted from the narrow broadcast-
ing range of the sound wave. To calculate the error rate, we ana-
lyzed the distribution model of the similarity, which is calculated by
fitting the similarity between identities to some probabilistic model
and choosing the most overlapped one. We decide the entropy ac-
cording to size of the distinguishable device pool calculated by the
error rate.
10. REFERENCES
[1] Android 4.4 blocked some SD card accessing.
http://lifehacker.com/android-kitkat-
blocks-some-access-to-micro-sd-cards-
1524997895.
[2] Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online.
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/05/
anonymity-privacy-and-security-online/.
[3] Apple set deadline for UDID.
http://www.engadget.com/2013/03/21/
apple-sets-a-may-1st-cutoff-for-app-
submissions-that-use-udid/.
[4] F-secure Mobile Treat Report.
https://www.f-secure.com/static/doc/
labs_global/Research/Mobile_Threat_
Report_Q1_2013.pdf.
[5] Frequency response of 3 speakers. http://community.
edmdistrict.com/showthread.php?7944-
Beats-Studios-doesn-t-sound-right.
[6] Google may stop tracking user by cookie. http:
//www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2013/09/
17/google-cookies-advertising/2823183/.
[7] iBeacon.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IBeacon.
10
[8] IDC Worldwide Smartphone Shipments.
https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?
containerId=prUS24645514.
[9] Spread spectrum. http:
//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spread_spectrum.
[10] UIUC Physics 406 Acoustical Physics of Music.
http://courses.physics.illinois.edu/
phys406/Lecture_Notes/P406POM_Lecture_
Notes/P406POM_Lect5.pdf.
[11] UUID of Android. http://developer.android.
com/reference/java/util/UUID.html.
[12] Wifi Positioning System. http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Wi-Fi_positioning_system.
[13] C. Arackaparambil, S. Bratus, A. Shubina, and D. Kotz. On
the reliability of wireless fingerprinting using clock skews. In
Proceedings of the third ACM conference on Wireless
network security, pages 169–174. ACM, 2010.
[14] K. Boda, Á. M. Földes, G. G. Gulyás, and S. Imre. User
tracking on the web via cross-browser fingerprinting. In
Information Security Technology for Applications, pages
31–46. Springer, 2012.
[15] K. Bonne Rasmussen and S. Capkun. Implications of radio
fingerprinting on the security of sensor networks. In Security
and Privacy in Communications Networks and the
Workshops, 2007. SecureComm 2007. Third International
Conference on, pages 331–340. IEEE, 2007.
[16] A. Boxall. Smartphone kill switch bill passes in california.
http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/
smartphone-kill-switch-bill-passes-in-
california/, May 2014.
[17] V. Brik, S. Banerjee, M. Gruteser, and S. Oh. Wireless device
identification with radiometric signatures. In Proceedings of
the 14th ACM international conference on Mobile computing
and networking, pages 116–127. ACM, 2008.
[18] S. Brown. Linear and Nonlinear Loudspeaker
Characterization. PhD thesis, WORCESTER
POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE, 2006.
[19] A. Das, N. Borisov, and M. Caesar. Fingerprinting smart
devices through embedded acoustic components. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1403.3366, 2014.
[20] L. C. C. Desmond, C. C. Yuan, T. C. Pheng, and R. S. Lee.
Identifying unique devices through wireless fingerprinting.
In Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless
network security, pages 46–55. ACM, 2008.
[21] S. Dey, N. Roy, W. Xu, R. R. Choudhury, and S. Nelakuditi.
Accelprint: Imperfections of accelerometers make
smartphones trackable. In Proceedings of the 20th Annual
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (Feb
2014), NDSS, volume 14, 2014.
[22] P. Eckersley. How unique is your web browser? In Privacy
Enhancing Technologies, pages 1–18. Springer, 2010.
[23] J. Franklin, D. McCoy, P. Tabriz, V. Neagoe, J. V. Randwyk,
and D. Sicker. Passive data link layer 802.11 wireless device
driver fingerprinting. In Proc. 15th USENIX Security
Symposium, pages 167–178, 2006.
[24] A. Gionis, P. Indyk, R. Motwani, et al. Similarity search in
high dimensions via hashing. In VLDB, volume 99, pages
518–529, 1999.
[25] L. G. Greenwald and T. J. Thomas. Toward undetected
operating system fingerprinting. In Proceedings of the first
USENIX workshop on Offensive Technologies, pages 1–10.
USENIX Association, 2007.
[26] L. G. Greenwald and T. J. Thomas. Understanding and
preventing network device fingerprinting. Bell Labs
Technical Journal, 12(3):149–166, 2007.
[27] J. Han, E. Owusu, L. T. Nguyen, A. Perrig, and J. Zhang.
Accomplice: Location inference using accelerometers on
smartphones. In Communication Systems and Networks
(COMSNETS), 2012 Fourth International Conference on,
pages 1–9. IEEE, 2012.
[28] B. Krishnamurthy and C. Wills. Privacy diffusion on the
web: a longitudinal perspective. In Proceedings of the 18th
international conference on World wide web, pages 541–550.
ACM, 2009.
[29] B. Krishnamurthy and C. E. Wills. Generating a privacy
footprint on the internet. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM
SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement, pages
65–70. ACM, 2006.
[30] J. Lester, B. Hannaford, and G. Borriello. a˛rˇare you with
me?a˛s´–using accelerometers to determine if two devices are
carried by the same person. In Pervasive computing, pages
33–50. Springer, 2004.
[31] J. Lukas, J. Fridrich, and M. Goljan. Digital camera
identification from sensor pattern noise. Information
Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on, 1(2):205–214,
2006.
[32] J. R. Mayer and J. C. Mitchell. Third-party web tracking:
Policy and technology. In Security and Privacy (SP), 2012
IEEE Symposium on, pages 413–427. IEEE, 2012.
[33] K. Mowery, D. Bogenreif, S. Yilek, and H. Shacham.
Fingerprinting information in javascript implementations. In
Proceedings of Web, volume 2, 2011.
[34] L. T. Nguyen and Y. Zhang. Probabilistic infrastructureless
positioning in the pocket. In Mobile Computing,
Applications, and Services, pages 311–330. Springer, 2012.
[35] N. Nikiforakis, A. Kapravelos, W. Joosen, C. Kruegel,
F. Piessens, and G. Vigna. Cookieless monster: Exploring
the ecosystem of web-based device fingerprinting. In
Security and Privacy (SP), 2013 IEEE Symposium on, pages
541–555. IEEE, 2013.
[36] F. Roesner. Detecung and defending against third–party
tracking on the web. 2012.
[37] M. Slaney and M. Casey. Locality-sensitive hashing for
finding nearest neighbors [lecture notes]. Signal Processing
Magazine, IEEE, 25(2):128–131, 2008.
[38] M. Smart, G. R. Malan, and F. Jahanian. Defeating tcp/ip
stack fingerprinting. In Proceedings of the 9th USENIX
Security Symposium, volume 6, 2000.
[39] A. Soltani, S. Canty, Q. Mayo, L. Thomas, and C. J.
Hoofnagle. Flash cookies and privacy. In AAAI Spring
Symposium: Intelligent Information Privacy Management,
2010.
[40] K. Takeda. User identification and tracking with online
device fingerprints fusion. In Security Technology (ICCST),
2012 IEEE International Carnahan Conference on, pages
163–167. IEEE, 2012.
[41] V. Toubiana, A. Narayanan, D. Boneh, H. Nissenbaum, and
S. Barocas. Adnostic: Privacy preserving targeted
advertising. In NDSS, 2010.
[42] O. Ureten and N. Serinken. Wireless security through rf
fingerprinting. Electrical and Computer Engineering,
Canadian Journal of, 32(1):27–33, 2007.
11
[43] T.-E. Wei, A. B. Jeng, H.-M. Lee, C.-H. Chen, and C.-W.
Tien. Android privacy. In Machine Learning and Cybernetics
(ICMLC), 2012 International Conference on, volume 5,
pages 1830–1837. IEEE, 2012.
[44] P. N. Yianilos. Data structures and algorithms for nearest
neighbor search in general metric spaces. In Proceedings of
the fourth annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete
algorithms, pages 311–321. Society for Industrial and
Applied Mathematics, 1993.
[45] X. Zhou, S. Demetriou, D. He, M. Naveed, X. Pan, X. Wang,
C. A. Gunter, and K. Nahrstedt. Identity, location, disease
and more: inferring your secrets from android public
resources. In Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC
conference on Computer & communications security, pages
1017–1028. ACM, 2013.
12
